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FOREWORD 
One of the goals of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis is to 
increase the understanding of what systems analysis is and what it can do . 
This paper, which was contributed by invitation to the Centennial Issue of Science, 
describes the genesis of systems analysis and gives a brief overview of the field , using exam-
ples to illustrate key points. Thus, it is designed to introduce systems analysis to a wide 
and varied audience . 
Another paper contributed by an IIASA staff member to this special Centennial Issue 
of Science provides a brief description of some key findings of a mature and comprehensive 
systems analysis: Wolf Hafele , "A Global and Long-Range Picture of Energy Developments ," 





Operations Research and 
Systems Analysis 
Operations research, unlike most sci-
ences, is able to point to a well-defined 
combination of circumstances and 
events that not only began its activities 
Hugh J. Miser 
as a coherent development but also 
caused its name to be coined. After Hit-
ler rose to power in Germany, England 
sought to prepare a suitable defense 
against possible air attack, with the re-
sult that, by late 1937, the key elements 
of an effective defense had been devised: 
radar and the Hurricane fighter plane. 
But combining them into an effective 
system could not be left to improvisa-
tion, as the disappointing results of an air 
exercise showed in July 1938. Con-
sequently, A. P. Rowe, then leader of 
the radar development work on En-
gland's east coast, proposed that re-
search into the operational-as opposed 
to the purely technical-aspects of the 
The author, professor of industrial engineering 
and operations research at the University of Massa-
chusetts , Amherst, is on leave while serving as exec-
utive editor for the International Institute for Ap-
plied Systems Analysis. Laxenburg. Austria. 
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radar-fighter system be undertaken, and 
the term .. operational research " was 
coined to desc ribe the work (/ ). 
This new kind of research , conducted 
in close cooperation with the officers and 
men of the Royal Air Force, led directly 
to substantial improvements in En-
gland's air defense system, which was 
given its most decisive test in the Battle 
of Britain during August and September 
of 1940. 
The success of this partnership be-
tween scientists and operating forces 
prompted the spread of operational re-
search to other British commands and 
services. When the United States en-
tered the war , this British precedent was 
pursued by U.S. military commanders, 
with the result that , by late 1942 , groups 
of scientists were undertaking similar 
work for both the U.S. Navy and Army 
Air Corps . However , the name had been 
Americanized to .. operations research ." 
By the end of the war , England, Cana-
da. and the United States had employed 
perhaps as many as 700 scientists in 
work loosely described by these terms 
(2). 
Some of the work that these scientists 
did merely exploited the technical back-
grounds that they brought to their war-
time tasks . However, there was also the 
important novelty that they had studied 
and evaluated the results of tactical oper-
ations, devised tactical innovations and 
predicted their possible consequences , 
and. when the innovations were actually 
used. compared expected results with 
those actually achieved. And this knowl-
edge had often become the basis for 
helping with tactical planning , and even , 
during the later stages of the war , for 
contributing important knowledge to 
strategic choices. 
History shows that operations re-
search workers made important contri-
butions to the war efforts of their coun-
tries. However . another outcome of this 
work was also important : Many of these 
scientists saw in their wartime scientific 
achievements the germ of a new science 
of operating man-machine systems that 
could be developed for peacetime activi-
ties and applied to their problems. 
The Science of Operations Research 
It is clear that many of these pioneers 
of operations research saw their work as 
being scientific; for example , as early as 
1941 P. M. S. Blackett (a physicist who 
later won a Nobel Prize for his work on 
cosmic rays), in a memorandum on '" Sci-
entists at the operational level ," empha-
sized that the work was .. scientific anal-
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ysis of operations" and should be staffed 
and carried out in the spirit of science 
(3). This memorandum had considerable 
influence on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Many of the scientists who became in-
volved with this wartime work were sur-
prised to find that there were identifiable 
stabilities in situations that they had al-
terns . By the end of the first decade after 
the war, examples were available to give 
substance to this expectation (7), and by 
now their number and variety are very 
great (8). A recent example typifies much 
of what has been done. 
In 1979 Eric Brodheim of the New 
York Blood Center and Gregory P. Pras-
Summary . The science of man-machine operating systems, which includes opera-
tions research and systems analysis, has achieved a substantial body of theory and 
application over the last 40 years. Its current strength prompts it to attack difficult 
large-scale problems while challenging the other relevant sciences to unite, not only 
with each other and operations and systems research, but also with society, to deal 
with some of the most widespread and important problems of our time. 
ways considered to be totally formless. 
For example , consider the outcomes of 
a ir combat. While a commander can con-
trol his own tactics, he cannot control 
those of his enemy , nor can he eliminate 
uncertainty in the weather. N everthe-
less , it was often possible to predict the 
outcomes with considerable accuracy 
(4). 
The sense of wonder that such sys-
tems of men and machines operating in 
conflict in a natural environment could 
exhibit aspects of regularity was ex-
pressed by two of the most notable U.S. 
operations research pioneers , Philip M. 
Morse (a physicist from Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology) and George E. 
Kimball (a chemist from Columbia Uni-
versity), when they wrote in 1946 that 
.. large bodies of men and equipment car-
rying out complex operations behave in 
an astonishingly regular manner, so that 
one can predict the outcome of such op-
erations to a degree not foreseen by most 
natural scientists" (5). 
Too , the World War II experiences 
had exhibited the classic cycle of the 
method of science (6) . The scientists had 
observed nature (albeit the startlingly 
new phenomena of military operations) , 
had built theories to account for these 
observations, had used them to predict 
future outcomes , and had tested these 
predictions against actual experience, 
with frequent agreement. Indeed , many 
of them had experienced several con-
nected and successive cycles, from 
which had emerged fairly comprehensive 
theories with accepted predictive value. 
Thus, the novelty of wartime operations 
research did not lie in the method that 
was being used , but rather in the part of 
" nature" to which it was applied: mili-
tary operations . 
The consequence was a natural one: 
Many scientists expected that operations 
research could be extended to a wide va-
riety of civilian peacetime operating sys-
tacos of the University of Pennsylvania 
reported a notable study (9, 10) of blood 
distribution and utilization that they had 
conducted in response to a national 
problem (9) . 
Each year over two million hospitalized 
Americans depend on the timely availability 
of the right type of blood products at 6,000 
hospital blood banks (HBBs) in the United 
States . If the right blood products are not 
available ... when required , then medical 
complications or postponements of elective 
surgery can result , which translate to extra 
days of hospitalization and expense. On the 
other hand, since most blood products may 
only be administered to a patient of the same 
blood type within 21 days of collection, over-
stocking at HBBs leads to low utilization , 
which increases costs and is wasteful of the 
scarce blood resource. 
Thus , as Johanna Pindyck, director of 
the Greater New York Blood Program 
(the largest in the world), expresses it, 
" We face the major problem of how to 
maximize the availability of blood to 
each of ... 262 hospitals ... while ef-
fectively discharging our implicit cove-
nant to our donors to see that their gift is 
efficiently utilized" (11 ). 
Since there are approximately 200 Re-
gional Blood Centers (RBC's) in the 
United States, Brodheim and Prastacos 
(9) viewed the problem from the RBC 
point of view, as well as from that of the 
HBB: 
Most blood products in the United States 
are derived from whole blood that is collected 
by an RBC in units of one pint from volunteer 
donors. After laboratory processing and test-
ing , whole blood and blood products derived 
from whole blood are distributed to the 
HBBs , where they are stored to be available 
for transfusion when requested . 
The complexity of the blood inventory-
management problem is due primarily to the 
perishability of blood , the uncertainties in-
volved in its availability to the RBC , and the 
fluctuating demands and usages at the HBBs. 
Too, there are large variations in the sizes of 
the HBBs to be supplied, in the relative oc-
currence of the different blood groups , and in 
the mix of whole blood and blood products 
used at each HBB. Finally, the performance 
of a regional (or hospital) blood-management 
system can be evaluated in terms of multiple 
criteria (or objectives), some of which conflict 
(e.g., availability vs. utilization of blood at an 
HBB), or involve costs that are difficult to es-
timate (e.g., the cost of unavailability) . 
As a result of this complexity , regional 
blood management systems have historically 
been decentralized and reactive in nature, 
characterized by the HBBs placing daily or-
ders to bring their inventory to what each 
considered a safe value, and the RBC trying 
to fill these orders as they came, while keep-
ing a necessary buffer in the stock. This 
created a feeling of uncertainty, as a result of 
which HBBs have generally tried to maintain 
high inventories of most of the 8 different 
types of each of these products in order to 
provide high availability to satisfy patient 
needs, and have accepted the low utilization 
resulting from spoilage. Consequently, the 
national utilization rate of whole blood and 
red blood cells prior to expiration was esti-
mated to be only 80 per cent in 1974. 
After studying the Long Island blood-
distribution system, which was the test 
bed for their analysis, Brodheim and 
Prastacos reasoned that three important 
management concepts should be intro-
duced into the approach they were ex-
ploring. 
I) The institution of a regional man-
agement system to allocate the regional 
resources among the HBB's would in-
crease the efficiency of resource utiliza-
tion. This would call for some form of 
centralized decision-making at the RBC, 
which would operate under the objective 
of overall regional efficiency. 
2) Some form of blood "rotation" 
would be required , whereby freshly pro-
cessed blood would be sent to an HBB 
from which it might be returned some 
time later, for redistribution according to 
the regional strategy. Any regional strat-
egy that allocates blood products to be 
retained until transfused or outdated 
would result in low utilization, especially 
in the case of the small-usage HBB's 
which, in aggregate, account for the larg-
est part of overall blood usage . 
3) It would also be desirable for a sig-
nificant portion of the periodic deliveries 
to the HBB 's to be prescheduled. In this 
way the uncertainty of supply faced 
by the HBB 's would be reduced, with a 
resulting improvement in the planning 
of operations and the utilization of re-
sources. 
The blood needs of an HBB can be ex-
pressed as the demand (that is, the num-
ber of units required to be on hand for 
possible transfusion) and the usage (that 
is, the number of units actually trans-
fused). However, from the RBC point of 
view, the effectiveness of the supply 
management can be measured in terms 
of two rates: the availability rate (that is, 
the fraction of days when the inventory 
of a given blood type on hand is suf-
ficient to meet the demand) and the utili-
zation rate (that is, the fraction of the 
supply that is transfused) . The first task 
of the analysts was therefore to devise a 
model that translated demand and usage 
to availability and utilization rates as 
functions of RBC blood-distribution poli-
cies and HBB blood-stocking policies. 
Since the availability rate at an HBB 
depends only on the pattern of demand 
and the inventory level, it could be ex-
plored on the basis of blood-bank data. 
The analysts found sufficient stability in 
the evidence to establish the " universal " 
piecewise linear relation between inven-
tory level and mean daily demand, with 
the availability rate as a parameter , 
shown in Fig. I. Tests showed that the 
ability of this model to predict was high. 
The availability rates that HBB man-
agers considered to be adequate ranged 
usually from 85 to 95 percent. 
The utilization rate depends on the 
size and age mix of the blood supply in 
an HBB , as well as the demand . The dis-
tribution strategy is also an important is-
sue. After consultations with the HBB 's, 
and in agreement with the management 
concepts outlined above, the following 
class of policies was chosen for analysis. 
Each HBB receives periodic shipments 
at intervals of I to 4 days (to be deter-
mined from the analysis, depending on 
the size of the HBB, and other consid-
erations). Each periodic shipment to the 
HBB includes a number of fresh (or long-
dated : 1- to 2-day-old) rotation units and 
a number of older (or stock-dated: 6- to 









retained until transfused or di scarded, 
but the rotation units that are in excess 
of a fixed desired inventory level at the 
end of the period are returned to the 
RBC for redistribution. Modeling this 
situation called for a finite-state Markov 
chain analysis. 
Having derived these models to pre-
dict the HBB availability and utilization 
rates for any policy implemented by the 
RBC , the analysts examined the regional 
allocation problem , assuming that there 
were fixed penalty costs associated with 
nonavailable and nonutilized units. They 
found that the policy minimizing the total 
expected one-period cost was (i) to allo-
cate all available retention units so as to 
equalize the utilization rates at all 
HBB's and then (ii) to allocate all avail-
able rotation units, which are not subject 
to spoilage while at the HBB, so as to 
equalize the availability rates at all 
HBBs. 
It was shown that this policy is inde" 
pendent of unit penalty costs and that it 
maximizes both the availability and utili-
zation of blood in the region simultane-
ously. That is, any deviation from the 
policy that would reduce utilization 
would also result in reduced availability 
for the next period , and vice versa. 
The analysts also found that the short-
term policy had the same structural char-
acteristics as the policy that was optimal 
over the long run, and even that the utili-
zation and availability rates calculated 
for the short term corresponded very 
closely to the optimal values for the long 
run. Thus, they could return to the result 
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Fig. 2. Illustration of a planned regional blood flow . [From Brodheim and Prastacos (9), courte-
sy of Interfaces] 
ed above for the one-period case was op-
timal, and they could establish the fol-
lowing principle (9): 
A distribution policy should seek to equal-
ize utilization rates and availability rates 
among the HBBs in the region. This is also a 
policy that has the essential elements of "fair-
ness"' in spreading equally the nonavailability 
and nonutilization risks amongst hospitals re-
gardless of their relative size, and is con-
sequently a highly defensible policy . 
With these results in hand , the ana-
lysts formulated the problem as a mathe-
matical program, which they used to de-
termine the appropriate distribution pol-
icy for the Long Island region . Figure 2 
gives an example of such a policy. 
The policy was then implemented in a 
sequence of planned steps, and was 
characterized by continuous interaction 
with the medical and administrative per-
sonnel, design of the necessary forms 
and procedures , educational sessions 
with the users, and development of an 
automated computer-based information 
system. The results were gratifying: utili-
zation and availability of blood improved 
significantly and wastage and delivery 
costs decreased by 80 percent and 64 
percent, respectively. The administra-
tive system derived from these results 
(/ 2) is being extended to the rest of the 
Greater New York Blood Program and is 
being considered for introduction else-
where in the United States and abroad . 
This example exhibits the pattern fa-
miliar to the wartime operations research 
analysts, and one that remains central to 
successful operations research work to 
this day: problem , observation , theory 
building (usually called modeling today) , 
problem solution based on calculations 
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from the theory , devising a system to be 
implemented, and testing it in actual 
practice, the analysts keeping in close 
touch throughout with the situation 
being studied and with the persons in-
volved with it. To this may be added two 
aspects that this brief example did not 
treat : implementation brings new prob-
lems for analysis , and a changing under-
lying situation may call for revisions in 
the basic research . 
The Methods 
Almost all of the work during the war 
borrowed methods and theories from 
existing fields-mathematical analysis, 
probability, statistics, and the natural 
sciences-with only an occasional new 
model being assembled from these ele-
ments to represent the new aspects of 
nature that the analysts were exploring. 
The most notable exception was a theory 
of search developed as part of the work 
for the U.S. Navy (13). 
The early postwar work followed the 
same pattern. Thus, it was hardly sur-
prising that Philip M. Morse , in retiring 
from the office of the first president of 
the Operations Research Society of 
America in 1953, said that "one of our 
major tasks ... is to develop analytic 
techniques and to broaden their range of 
application" (14). The operations re-
search community ' s response to this 
challenge was to produce a rapid flow of 
theoretical developments that continues 
unabated to this day. Here it is possible 
to mention only important currents, rely-
ing on the reader to consult the new 
Handbook of Operations Research (/ 5) 
for further elucidation and guides to im-
portant literature . 
Some theories that already existed 
were extended significantly . For ex-
ample , the theory of stochastic process-
es represented many systems of interest 
to operations research workers, who 
contributed to its development. The re-
lated theory of queues, which entered a 
mature period in 1950 owing to its exten-
sive application in telephony, developed 
explosively, not only because of its 
mathematical challenge but also be-
cause of the widespread occurrence of 
queues in modern society and, therefore, 
in the systems studied by operations re-
search workers . Optimal control theory, 
which advanced in response to opera-
tions research problems, value theory, 
which deals with what importance to at-
tach to various possibilities, and game 
theory, which offered a challenging 
framework for thought about operational 
problems and choices, were all pursued 
energetically. 
Operations research also produced 
new theories offering both significant in-
tellectual challenge and important vistas 
of potential application. The best known 
of these is linear programming, which, 
like queuing theory, advanced rapidly in 
the three decades since the 1947 devel-
opment of the simplex method by 
George B. Dantzig (who received the 
U .S. National Medal of Science in 1975 
for his work in this field) . The related 
fields of integer programming, geometric 
programming, nonlinear programming, 
large-scale programming, and stochastic 
programming also developed in response 
to needs in applications. The concept of 
decision assumed considerable impor-
tance early in the history of operations 
research , and a theory of decision now 
deals with such difficulties as those that 
arise when multiple and competing cri-
teria are present. Dynamic programming 
is applicable to many kinds of sequential 
decision problems ; the theory of flows in 
networks has a wide variety of appli-
cations ; the theory of simulation is im-
portant for problems where analytic the-
ories are cumbersome or inaccessible 
but where practical imperatives push the 
analyst to results ; and the art of heuristic 
problem-solving is playing a growing role 
in handling problems of high computa-
tional complexity (16) . 
Arenas of Application 
As operations research workers have 
dealt with the problems of business, in-
dustry, and government, they have ob-
served many conceptual strands com-
mon to various operational processes. 
Thus , they have assembled groups of 
methods and models appropriate to 
many common functional processes, in-
cluding production planning, inventory 
control, facilities location and layout, 
scheduling and sequencing, project plan-
ning and control, reliability , mainte-
nance and replacement, marketing, hu-
man resource management, and fore-
casting (15, vol. 2). The Handbook of 
Operations Research devotes chapters 
(/ 5 , vol. 2) to eight arenas of application 
(urban services, health services, educa-
tional processes , transportation systems , 
military systems , electric utilities, the 
process industries, and the leisure indus-
tries), but the list can easily be length-
ened to include banking, advertising , 
university administration, state and local 
government, federal govenment, high-
way safety, communication system man-
agement, agriculture, library and infor-
mation system management, mining and 
the mineral industries, forestry and for-
est products , and many more (17) . 
The concerns of business and indus-
try-and of management generally-are 
conspicuous in these lists, which ex-
plains why much of the work is carried 
out and reported under the rubric of 
"management science. " However, only 
a stickler for fine detail would trouble to 
distinguish management science from 
operations research by more than the 
practical context of the work (18). 
Lest the preceding discussion suggest 
that operations research can flourish on-
ly in big institutional contexts, let us turn 
to an issue of local governmental con-
cern: a school desegregation issue in a 
community of modest size . 
In 1954 the Supreme Court of the 
United States ruled that segregated 
schools for black and white children 
were an unacceptable form of public 
education and that schools should begin 
admitting students without racial dis-
crimination "with all deliberate speed." 
A 1968 decision had the effect of speed-
ing up the process of desegregation, and, 
to this end, it gave federal courts the 
authority to order busing school chil-
dren as one way of achieving the de-
sired goal. 
In addition to arousing a storm of so-
cial and ethical issues , these landmark 
decisions presented school boards and 
school officials with two practical diffi-
culties . 
I) What, in quantitative terms, did the 
court mean by desegregation? Must 
every school have the same distribution 
by races as the regional population? Or is 
there some maximum allowable varia-
tion? The decisions did not deal directly 
with these questions, so the only course 
open to a school jurisdiction was to de-
vise a plan , calculate the resulting school 
population distribution , and then submit 
it to the court to see whether or not it 
would win approval. 
2) The practical difficulties of school 
and bus assignments are formidable, par-
ticularly if the numbers of schools and 
students are large, and if such con-
straints as restricting the amount of addi-
tional travel for students are considered. 
When members of the school board 
of Alachua County, Florida (in which 
Gainesville is located), faced these diffi-
culties , they obtained the assistance of 
Peter C. Belford and H. Donald Ratliff of 
the science faculty at the University of 
Florida in Gainesville . These two inves-
tigators approached the first of the two 
difficulties in this way, as explained in a 
1971 account of their work (19): 
In order to get some feel for what the courts 
consider to be " acceptable" desegregation 
plans , we contacted a number of organiza-
tions, including the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare and the National As-
sociation for the Advancement of Colored 
People, requesting any available information 
concerning desegregation plans that had been 
submitted to the courts for approval. In every 
case these organizations were either unable or 
unwilling to provide this information . We 
were finally able to obtain from individual 
school districts ten plans that had been ac-
cepted by the courts since 1967. These plans 
were from school districts in Alabama, Cali-
fornia , Florida, and Georgia, and were ap-
proved by several courts. 
Since the courts did not give reasons for ac-
cepting these plans, an attempt was made to 
determine empirically from them some quan-
titative measures of acceptability upon which 
future plans could be based . Two measures 
that seemed reasonable were the maximum 
allowable deviation from the actual percent 
black in a given district , and the average al-
lowable deviation from the actual percent 
black in a given district. Since a number of the 
plans had at least one school that was almost 
all white or almost all black, the maximum de-
viation provided little information. 
The available information on the de-
viation that would be allowed for a given 
school from the actual percentage of 
blacks in a given district showed figures 
as high as 34 percentage points for 
schools with more blacks than the dis-
trict average and 24 points for schools 
with fewer blacks than the average. 
However, it appeared , when the court 
decisions were viewed over time , that 
the allowable deviations from the district 
percentage of blacks were decreasing. 
Therefore, the school board of Alachua 
County , with this trend in mind, decided 
arbitrarily to seek a plan that would keep 
the percentage of blacks within 5 points 
on either side of the district percentage 
of 30 (in other words , each school would 
be required to have between 25 and 35 
percent blacks) , a decision that would 
yield an average deviation from 30 per-
cent of somewhat less than 5 points, a 
figure small enough to appear likely to 
gain court approval. 
The next step was to consider the 
problem of assigning students to schools 
to meet the desired objective , plus other 
problems such as keeping the additional 
distances traveled by students down to 
acceptable levels. For this purpose the 
analysts constructed a model of the situ-
ation. The school district was divided in-
to a large number of student locations, 
each of which may be thought of as being 
the size of one block and the location of a 
school bus stop. For each location the 
analysts knew the numbers of white and 
black students living there and their cur-
rent grade assignments , and the dis-
tances from the location to each avail-
able school in the district by the most di-
rect routes . 
The numbers of white and black stu-
dents from each location that had to be 
assigned to each school were then deter-
mined under these restrictions: 
I) Each student was to be assigned to 
exactly one school. 
2) Each school was to have assigned 
to it a number of students equal to its ca-
pacity , which was known in advance. 
3) The proportion of black students 
assigned to each school was to be be-
tween 25 and 35 percent of its capacity. 
Some desirable features were also 
added: 
4) No assignment would be made that 
caused a student to be bused more than 
10 miles from home to school. 
5) Any student who lived within 2 
miles of an appropriate school would not 
be bused at all-he or she would walk . 
And , of great importance: 
6) Assignments would be made so as 
to minimize the total number of student-
miles traveled. 
Some transformations of this formula-
tion allowed it to be recognized as a min-
imum-cost flow problem in a single-com-
modity network, for which there is not 
only adequate theory but also several ef-
ficient methods of computation. 
The desired number of students in 
each school and the desired bounds on 
the number of black and white students 
in each school were provided by the su-
perintendent' s office. Each school dis-
trict was designated as either an elemen-
tary school (kindergarten through fifth 
grade) , a middle school (sixth through 
eighth grades), or a high school (ninth 
through twelfth grades). Each system 
was then treated independently . 
For the elementary school system 
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there were 6887 students (of whom ap-
proximately 30 percent were black) , 298 
student locations, and 11 schools. The 
computed results for this system were : 
• Percent black : 25 (four schools), 29, 
33, 34 , 35 (four schools). 
•Average number of miles traveled 
by the 2005 bused students (of whom 944 
were white and 1061 black): 6. 
• Total number of student-bus-miles : 
11,628. 
Similar results were obtained for the 
middle and high schools. Figure 3 shows 
how the student locations were assigned 
to the three high schools. 
The desegregation plan generated by 
the model was used as the basis for re-
zoning the schools in Gainesville; while 
some minor changes were made by the 
school officials, the final districts put into 
operation were almost indistinguishable 
from those derived by the computer (20). 
As quite often happens , this study 
shed some light on other issues, notably 
the concern of the public that busing to 
achieve integration would involve stu-
dents in long , time-consuming rides. 
2 
3 
However , a supplementary analysis 
showed this fear to be largely without 
substance. A comparison of the desegre-
gation assignment with an optimal as-
signment of students to schools without 
regard to race showed that the racially 
balanced assignment increased the stu-
dent-bus-miles by only 20, 6, and 7 per-
cent for the elementary , middle, and high 
schools, respectively. " The results in-
dicate that the actual increase in busing 
is much less, at least for the Gainesville 
system , than one might anticipate" (/9). 
Systems Analysis 
Since the brief account of the wartime 
work in operations research showed how 
the work began in tactics but grew into 
planning and strategy , it is natural to 
look for a similar pattern in postwar 
work . The two examples already 
sketched deal with tactical work but 
must not be read to suggest that only tac-
tical work has been done . Rather, the 
wartime pattern has been followed: solid 
0 Assigned to school 1 
o Assigned to school 2 
"' Assigned to school 3 
Fig. 3. Assignment of student locations to schools for the high schools of Gainesville , Florida. 
[From Belford and Ratliff (19), courtesy of Operations Research] 
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foundations in tactical understanding 
have led to involvement in planning and 
strategy in man.y arenas (notably in de-
fense and large corporations , but with in-
stances of successful involvement in 
many other contexts as diverse as local 
government and university manage-
ment) . 
However , it has been evident that 
each system worked on is merely a sub-
system in a larger system-indeed, one 
of an ever widening congeries of systems. 
Thus , just as the radar-fighter system 
was part of a larger warfare system for 
the defense of England, so the regional 
blood-collection and -distribution system 
supports the hospitals of its region, 
which are a part of the nation's health 
care system ; and the school-busing sys-
tem for Gainesville is a supporting sub-
system in the educational system for this 
city. 
Consequently , the purposes of the 
subsystems are subservient to the pur-
poses of the larger systems of which they 
are parts. For example , the school-as-
signment study aimed to use the buses to 
achieve a rough equality of the propor-
tion of blacks in each school, the equal-
proportion objective being an expression 
of a goal of the social system in which 
the school system was embedded . Simi-
larly, the objectives the analysts adopted 
of having the students within 2 miles of 
their schools walk there and of limiting 
any bus ride to less than 10 miles are 
quantitative interpretations of social 
goals perceived to be held by the com-
munity. For the busing system to con-
tribute to the goals of the larger system 
of which it is a subsystem, it has to oper-
ate somewhat "inefficiently," if we in-
terpret efficiency as the subsystem ob-
jective of getting the students to school 
with a minimum of travel. 
The success of operations research 
workers in developing scientific theories 
describing important classes of phenom-
ena occurring in man-machine operating 
systems and in using these models 
to solve problems arising in these sys-
tems has inevitably driven them to study 
larger and larger systems or, in other 
words, to what is now called " systems 
analysis" (21). 
But this imperative arises because it is 
intrinsic to the problems that society 
has, and the ways they are embedded in 
large systems . For example: our high-
way traffic system combines drivers and 
passengers, pedestrians, roads, vehicles, 
the customs and rules of the road , the 
weather, the surrounding environment, 
and the energy sources that make it 
work ; our energy system includes the 
sources from which we derive energy, 
the means for converting these sources 
to usable forms , the distribution devices 
and procedures, the using community 
(including the highway traffic system), 
the political and international environ-
ment that affects energy deliveries and 
costs, and the natural and economic en-
vironment in which energy is used (and 
that is affected by energy use); the ana-
lyst concerned with air quality must 
study a system consisting, not only of 
the atmosphere and the natural global 
and terrestrial features that affect its be-
havior, but also of the patterns of human 
activity (including both transportation 
and energy use generally) that contribute 
to the deterioration of air quality; and so 
on. 
As the operations research analyst is 
driven toward considering the operations 
of these larger systems, his classical 
partnership with the operators of the 
smaller subsystems (the managers of the 
RBC's and HBB's, for example) has to 
be extended to include, not only oper-
ating and policy officials with much 
larger purviews, but also scientists with 
other specialties relevant to the prob-
lems. For example, a comprehensive 
study of an air quality issue could de-
mand not only operations research ana-
lysts and meteorologists but also de-
mographers, economists, statisticians, 
chemists, energy systems engineers, and 
regional planners-in addition to the ap-
propriate officials who should also par-
ticipate in the work. 
Thus, although historically systems 
analysis emerged largely from the early 
operations research work, as it is con-
ducted today it is highly interdisci-
plinary . However, to reach its highest 
goals it must be pandisciplinary in the 
sense of combining the contributions of 
the various supporting disciplines into 
new syntheses-in other words, into 
new science explaining the behavior of 
the large systems it is studying. 
Since major systems analyses are 
nearly always closely associated with 
major institutional policy decisions (22), 
the reports that describe them often do 
not find their way into the archival litera-
ture of science. Complete treatments are 
always too long for the usual journal ar-
ticle, and book-length treatment is some-
what deterred by the context of much of 
the work. Nevertheless, the literature is 
accumulating, both to describe case 
studies and to provide overviews of how 
such work is done (23). This literature 
shows that systems analysts expect a 
reasonably comprehensive systems anal-
ysis to: 
I) Marshal both the evidence relating 
to the problem and the scientific know)-
edge bearing on it , and when necessary 
to develop new knowledge. 
2) Examine critically the social pur-
poses-of both persons and institu-
tions-relating to the problem. 
3) Explore alternative ways of achiev-
ing these purposes and, frequently, to 
design or invent new possibilities . 
4) Reconsider the problem in the light 
of the knowledge accumulated during the 
analysis. 
5) Estimate the impacts of various 
possible courses of action , taking into 
consideration both the uncertain future 
and the organizational structures that 
must carry these courses of action for-
ward . 
6) Compare the alternatives by apply-
ing a variety of criteria to the con-
sequences. 
7) Present the results of the study to 
all concerned in a framework suitable for 
choice. 
8) Assist in following through on the 
actions chosen. 
9) Evaluate the results of implement-
ing the chosen courses of action. 
The listing of these steps in order does 
not imply that they take place in this or-
der in a systems analysis study. Rather, 
there is almost always a great deal of re-
cycling of ideas and analysis; for ex-
ample, the impacts of the chosen courses 
of action may dictate reconsidering the 
social purposes, the analysis of the cho-
sen alternatives may generate new and 
more interesting ones for consideration, 
and so on. Nor do all systems analyses 
carry out all of the steps; only some may 
be needed by the user. Since the world 
does not stand still while the work is go-
ing on , its changes may dictate major 
changes in content and approach or, 
since user representatives must work 
with the analysis team throughout if the 
work is to be effective, early results may 
get translated into action or policy quick-
ly. All of these influences may change 
the pattern of the work. 
However, the central goal of the sys-
tems analyst is to bring results to bear on 
the functions of complex operating sys-
tems in society with a view to improving 
them; he helps those with relevant inter-
ests and responsibilities to change these 
functions beneficently. His analysis ac-
tivities are aimed at assuring himself and 
others, to the extent possible, that the 
changes will have desired results. But 
these goals must be pursued under im-
portant limitations and difficulties: 
I) Even though the analyst may 
dream of considering a system so large 
as to include within it all of the factors 
important to the problem, more practical 
considerations may require that reason-
able boundaries be set so that the work 
can be completed and reported on a 
schedule that will make its findings ef-
fective. 
2) The system under study is tied to 
an ongoing process of some sort in so-
ciety that cannot be isolated for analysis 
and, therefore, must be dealt with in vivo, 
with many conflicting vested interests 
watching the analysis and its results. 
Since this setting denies the analyst the 
privilege of a secret burial of any mis-
takes that may be made, one of the hall-
marks of systems analysis today is a lit-
erature of strong criticism (24), good for 
the progress of the field but perhaps 
misleading in its net public impact. 
3) Further-and perhaps most unset-
tling from the current conservative view 
of science and its role in society-the an-
alyst must work as a part of a system that 
his results may change. 
What can be said, then, of the current 
state of the science of man-machine op-
erating systems? It is well founded , ac-
tive , and growing in size and importance 
(25). The cornerstone science of opera-
tions research has advanced to a state of 
significant maturity, with its underlying 
theories advancing, the scope and varie-
ty of problems it deals with expanding, 
and the effectiveness of its findings grow-
ing in importance. However, systems 
analysis, still in an earlier, more forma-
tive stage of development, faces several 
difficulties . The first concerns the scale 
of effort and institutional support. Clear-
ly, if large-scale problems are to be tack-
led with interdisciplinary teams, such 
teams must be available, and there must 
be administrative arrangements that en-
able them to work together closely, con-
ditions that seldom exist today, even in 
large U.S. government bureaus (26). 
However, there is a notable exception on 
the international scene that should be 
mentioned: the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, 
Austria , a nongovernmental research in-
stitute founded in 1972 and today sup-
ported by 17 countries from both East 
and West, brings together scientists from 
more than 20 countries to conduct analy-
ses on important international problems, 
such as those of energy and food. 
The second difficulty concerns access 
to problems and the information bearing 
on them. To the worker in a classical sci-
ence this may seem surprising, and it 
may be useful to recall, as an example, 
the number of institutions and adminis-
trations involved with energy problems . 
All of them have information that may be 
relevant to a systems analysis and many 
of them may have to be influenced by the 
results, if the findings are to be effective. 
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Unless there is cooperative access and 
active participation in the work-some-
times forthcoming and sometimes not-
the systems analysis may be handi-
capped, or rendered useless. 
The third difficulty relates to the U.S . 
science establishment's widely held phi-
losophy of science. This philosophy , 
epitomized by the dichotomy "pure" 
and "applied" science, is quite in-
adequate for systems analysis, which 
clearly is inseparably both, in the best 
traditions of science's long history. 
The last difficulty is the lack of a code 
of good practice , widely accepted by 
both the public and the community of 
science, to guide science ' s attempts to 
influence public policy and to give the 
public a fair and realistic concept of what 
to expect from science and systems anal-
ysis (27). 
The Challenge of Systems Analysis 
The urgency for developing systems 
analysis arises from the imperatives of 
society ' s problems : they call for the sort 
of approach that systems analysis repre-
sents. It is in the name of these urgent 
social problems that systems analysis ex-
tends its challenge to all of science. The 
problems to be addressed are some of 
the most important of our age and in-
volve systems for which our thoroughly 
inadequate understanding must be im-
proved, an improvement to which all sci-
ences will be called on to contribute. 
The work of operations research ana-
lysts, even in the short history of their 
subject, assures us that the difficulties to 
be overcome by systems analysis are in-
trinsic and important and will call forth 
the greatest scientific ability and inge-
nuity; the result will be important new 
science and signif.cant applications. 
Since the goals and objectives of society 
and its subsystems are essential in-
gredients in a systems analysis, the 
spokesmen for these ideas (our literary 
men, political leaders, and philosophers) 
must become involved , thus offering sci-
ence the naturally created opportunity-
indeed , the obligation-of forming a 
union, not only of the sciences, but also 
with the arts, in the common enterprise 
of improving the lot of mankind. 
The commonly accepted philosophy of 
science today must expand and mature 
to encompass systems analysis activities 
as an expression of scientific work. 
Leading thinkers in this field today (28) 
assure us that this is a natural extension 
of the classical activities of science and 
its philosophy , as well as a reasonable 
outgrowth of the philosophy of science 
as it has been developed in recent years . 
Many of the operations and systems 
research workers in the United States 
gather at the semiannual joint meetings 
of the Operations Research Society of 
America and the Institute of Manage-
ment Sciences . In addressing one of 
these meetings on 16 October 1979, Her-
bert A. Simon, who won the 1978 Nobel 
Prize in economics, hailed it as "a cele-
bration of human rationality. '' The chal-
lenge to science and society is to enlarge 
this celebration to include the rational 
management of all of society's systems 
and their problems. 
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